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This brief is submitted on behalf of the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as amicus
curiae in support of respondent.
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1
The National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers ("NACDL"), a non-profit corporation, is the
preeminent organization advancing the mission of
the criminal defense bar to ensure justice and due
process for persons accused of crime or wrongdoing.
A professional bar association founded in 1958,
NACDL’s approximately 10,000 direct members in
28 countries--and 90 state, provincial, and local
affiliate organizations totaling up to 40,000
attorneys--include private criminal defense lawyers,
public defenders, military defense counsel, law
professors, and judges committed to preserving
fairness and promoting a rational and humane
criminal justice system. The American Bar
Association recognizes NACDL as an affiliate
organization and awards it full representation in the
ABA’s House of Delegates. NACDL was founded to
promote criminal law research, to advance and
disseminate knowledge in the area of criminal
practice, and to encourage integrity, independence,
and expertise among criminal defense counsel.
1 Pursuant to this Supreme Court Rule 37.3(a), the parties
have consented to the filing of this brief. Amicus affirms,
pursuant to Rule 37.6, that no counsel for any party authored
this brief in any manner, and no one, other than amicus, made
a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of
this brief.
2NACDL is particularly dedicated to advancing the
proper, efficient, and just administration of justice,
including issues involving the individual liberties
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. In the
furtherance of this and its other objectives, the
NACDL files approximately 50 amicus curiae briefs
each year, in this Court and others, addressing a
wide variety of criminal justice issues. NACDL has a
particular interest in this case because the decision
of the court below raises important issues regarding
the scope of the protections of the Fourth
Amendment.
SUMMARY OF ARGIYMENT
If this Court concludes that the court of appeals
failed to determine whether the actions of the
petitioners in 2004 violated then clearly established
law, it should remand the case to the court of appeals
with instruction to do so in the first instance. This
case presents a substantial number of distinct
constitutional claims involving multiple defendants
and numerous disputed questions of fact. This Court
should not, without benefit of a thorough analysis by
the lower courts, undertake to resolve whether the
relevant law was clearly established in 2004.
For similar reasons, if the Court decides to
remand this case to permit the court of appeals to
decide whether the asserted constitutional rights
were clearly established at the time of the shootings,
the Court should not attempt to resolve all the
constitutional questions posed by this case.
Under Tennessee v. Garner only a current
significant threat of death or serious injury can
justify the use of deadly force. It was clearly
established in 2004 that such force could no longer be
utilized once a threat had ended. The petitioners
may not justify their use of force on asserted dangers
than had ended before the shots were fired.
Petitioners argue that Rickard’s driving was "a
danger to himself’ and "posed a threat" to his
passenger. Neither circumstance, if present, would
warrant killing Rickard (to protect him from injury
in a car crash) or using force virtually certain to kill
his passenger.
The courts below properly identified several
material disputed facts underlying petitioners’ claim
of qualified immunity. The video recordings do not
demonstrate that Rickard attempted to ram police
cars on the highway, or that he succeeded in doing so
in the parking lot. Petitioners cannot rely on their
own affidavits to establish the existence of
undisputed facts supporting summary judgment.
Because the petitioners are interested parties, a jury
would not be required to believe their testimony.
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S.
133 (2000).
The United States contends that "the video makes
clear" that Rickard’s car was being operated in the
parking lot "in a dangerous manner." That assertion
is at odds with footnote one of the government’s brief,
which does not challenge the district court’s
conclusion that the video was inconclusive at best.
The "maneuvers" on which the government
apparently relies occurred after the police began
shooting at Rickard, not before.
The United States contends that the use of lethal
force was justified because Rickard had led a "high-
speed" chase. But the record does not contain
conclusive evidence regarding the speed of Rickard’s
car. A police affidavit asserts only that Rickard was
going "at least 75 [m.p.h.]" on 1-40. The speed limit
on that interstate highway is 70 miles per hour.
ARGUMENT
I. IF THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO DETERMINE
WHETHER PETITIONERS CONDUCT VIOLATED
RICKARD’S CLEARLY ESTABLISHED
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, THIS COURT SHOULD
REMAND THE CASE TO THE COURT OF APPEALS
WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO Do So
Petitioners and the Solicitor General contend that
the court of appeals erred in failing to determine the
state of the law at the time the incident occurred.
Pet. Br. 13-14; U.S. Br. 13. The Solicitor General
suggests that if the Court finds that the court of
appeals erred in this manner, it should "remand for
the court of appeals to conduct the qualified-
immunity analysis in the first instance." U.S. Br. 12.
With respect to that issue, we agree with the
Solicitor General. If the Court concludes that the
court of appeals failed to determine the state of the
law in 2004, the Court should decline to answer the
qualified immunity question in the first instance,
and should instead remand the case to the lower
court.
The Court does not normally decide issues that
were not resolved below. National Collegiate Athletic
Assn. v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459, 470 (1999). When the
Court concludes that a lower court erred in one
respect, and resolution of the case turns on other
issues that the lower court did not address, the Court
typically remands for resolution of the unresolved
issues.
Nothing in the procedural posture of this case
warrants departing from the Court’s usual practice
of remanding a case in such circumstances. To the
contrary, the case presents an unusually complex
controversy, which would entangle the Court in a
number of factbound and subsidiary questions. See
Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. California, Inc., --
U.S. --, --, 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1211 (2012) ("Given the
complexity of these cases, rather than ordering
reargument, we vacate the Ninth Circuit’s judgments
and remand the cases, thereby permitting the parties
to argue the matter before that Circuit in the first
instance.’).
In order to address the qualified immunity issues
raised by this case, the Court would first have to
compare the conflicting accounts of the plaintiff and
defendants and evaluate their differences in light of
the substantial record, a process that would involve
carefully reviewing the three video recordings. The
district court concluded that in several important
respects the recordings do not support, conclusively
or perhaps at all, the defendants’ version of the facts.
The United States understandably declines to
5attempt to resolve these disagreements. U.S. Br. 19-
20 n.1.
The Court would then have to assess the
differences between the knowledge, and actions, of
the multiple defendants. With regard to the chase on
1-40, some officers could see what Rickard was doing,
while others could not; who could see what is not
always clear. Several officers made statements on
the radio about what was going on; which other
officers heard those statements is not apparent from
the record. J.A. 216, 222 It would be necessary to
determine whether these radio broadcasts could be
relied on by other officers. See U.S. Br. 32-33. During
the events in the parking lot immediately preceding
the shooting of Rickard and Allen, the individual
defendants were at various locations, and could have
perceived the developments differently. For example,
officer Galteli stated that at the time he mistakenly
believed that the first shots--which were actually
fired by officer Plumhoff--had been fired by Rickard.
J.A. 216. These differences in what each officer knew
would bear on whether he was entitled to qualified
immunity.
The 15 bullets were fired over a period of time
under varying circumstances; those differences may
well be relevant to whether the shooter would be
entitled to qualified immunity.2 Some shots were
fired while Rickard was moving alongside officer
2 See Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1150 (7th Cir. 1994)
(stating that the appropriate method of analysis is to "carve up
the incident into segments and judge each on its own terms to
see if the officer was reasonable at each stage").
Plumhoff, or in the direction of officer Ellis, while
other bullets were fired after Rickard was moving
away from (and thus assuredly not endangering) all
the officers.3 J.A. 165-66, 211. Some shots were fired
through the passenger window, posing a particular
danger to Allen, while others were fired at the
moving car from a sufficient distance that accurate
aim would have been difficult. While in most
instances the officers held their guns at eye level and
could aim them at Rickard, the first shots were fired
by Plumhoff when he was standing close to the
passenger side of the car, and presumably could not
have actually seen Rickard when he fired. Thus, in
addition to any differences deriving from variations
in what particular officers knew, qualified immunity
might to some degree have to be assessed on a bullet-
by-bullet basis.
That analysis would be further complicated by the
fact that the petitioners have adduced a number of
distinct justifications for their actions, which to some
extent have evolved over the course of the litigation.
The United States presents yet additional fact-bound
theories as to why the petitioners should be accorded
qualified immunity. Each of these different
arguments would have to be considered separately as
to each of the defendants, and perhaps as to each
bullet.
3 See Ellis v. Wynalda, 999 F.2d 243, 247 (7th Cir. 1993)("When
an officer faces a situation in which he could justifiably shoot,
he does not retain the right to shoot at any time thereafter with
impunity.’).
Finally, it would be necessary to assess the
numerous issues thus identified in light of what law
was clearly established in 2004 in the Sixth and
Eighth Circuits, and to decide--to the extent that
those circuits’ case law differedmwhich circuit’s law
would be controlling.4
It would be inappropriate for this Court to attempt
all of this without the benefit of such a particularized
analysis by the court of appeals. In the past, the
Court has expressed reluctance to address a question
"without the benefit of a thorough lower court
opinion." Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, --
U.S. --, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1430 (2012). If, after the
lower courts decide these issues on remand a party
seeks review by this Court, the issues presented will
be cleaner and in all likelihood considerably
narrowed and more focused.
II. IF THE COURT REMANDS THE QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY ISSUES, IT SHOULD NOT REACH THE
CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS
The Solicitor General suggests that if the Court
decides that the qualified immunity questions should
be considered in first instance by the court of
appeals, "the better course in this case is to decline to
reach the constitutional question ...." U.S. Br. 31; see
Resp. Br. 3. We agree.
4 See Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2094 (2012); see also
U.S. Br. 25.
Unlike Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007), which
involved only a single officer, act, and constitutional
question, this case presents a multiplicity of officers,
actions, and distinct constitutional questions. All of
those questions would have to be resolved before the
Court could conclude, as it did in Scott, that no
violation had occurred.
In light of the unresolved factual disputes in this
case, any issues addressed by this Court would have
an unavoidable hypothetical quality. The Court
would be undertaking to decide whether
constitutional violations would be presented by a
case in which all of those disputes were resolved in
favor of the plaintiff. Were the case to proceed to
trial, the jury’s findings of fact might present a far
different set of constitutional questions. To the
extent that petitioners rely on the speed of the chase
that occurred on 1-40, the Court’s task at this
juncture would be confounded by that fact that the
record contains little evidence, and nothing
conclusive, about how fast Rickard was driving.
Because of the unresolved factual issues, the
justification for the shooting of Rickard and Allen
would have to rest exclusively on the speed with
which Rickard drove during the car on 1-40. That
would present a constitutional issue that is fairly
uncommon. In virtually all the lower court decisions
involving firing at fleeing motorists, the drivers have
taken some other, more dangerous actions that posed
a distinct and graver risk of harm to others.
The circumstances of this case are also
idiosyncratic because the officers fired at a car in
l0
which there was an innocent passenger, and did so in
a manner that virtually assured that the passenger
would be killed, as indeed she was. Plaintiff argues
that this circumstance weighs heavily against the
reasonableness of the actions of the defendant
officers, several of whom were subsequently indicted
for killing Allen. Because it is virtually unheard of
for law enforcement officers to direct a fusillade of
bullets at a moving car with an innocent passenger,
this issue--whatever its merits--is unlikely to arise
with any frequency.
III. A NUMBER OF PROFFERED JUSTIFICATIONS ARE
INCONSISTENT WITH CLEARLY ESTABLISHED LAW IN
2004
1. Petitioners repeatedly rely on events that had
ended before lethal force (or much of it) was used.
Pet. Br. 3, 21-22, 27. But, as this Court held in
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), it is the
current existence of once the threat of danger to
officers or others, not a past threat, that alone
justifies the use of deadly force. 471 U.So at 3 (deadly
force may be employed when "officer has probable
cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant
threat of death or serious physical injury to the
officer or others") (emphasis added); id. at 11
("Where the suspect poses no immediate threat to the
officer and no threat to others, the harm resulting
from failing to apprehend him does not justify the
use of deadly force to do so.") (emphasis added). Scott
v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 386 (2007), held that a
"police officer’s attempt to terminate a dangerous
high-speed car chase that threatens the lives of
innocent bystanders does not violate the Fourth
11
Amendment, even when it places the fleeing motorist
at risk of serious injury or death." (emphasis added).
Prior to 2004, several circuits had held--and no
circuit had ruled to the contrary--that when the
threat to officers or the public ends, so too does the
justification for employing deadly force.5 In Russo v.
City of Cincinnati, 953 F.2d 1036 (6th Cir. 1992), for
example, police officers twice fired at a mentally ill
individual when he charged the officers with a knife.
The assailant retreated to another part of the
building, and ten minutes later again approached the
officers, this time without the weapon. The police
fired again, killing him. The court of appeals noted
that it had clearly established that a "person has a
right not to be shot unless he is perceived to pose a
threat to the pursuing officers or others." Id. at 1045
(citing Robinson v. Bibb, 840 F.2d 349, 351 (6th
Cir.1988)). The court then found that plaintiffs
raised "a genuine issue of fact as to whether, in the
[later]        round of discharges of the officers’
revolvers, the officers may have shot Bubenhofer
5 E.g., Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279, 294 (3d Cir. 1999) ("A
passing risk to a police officer is not an ongoing license to kill
an otherwise unthreatening suspect."); Wynalda, 999 F.2d at
247 (’~¢¢hen an officer faces a situation in which he could
justifiably shoot, he does not retain the right to shoot at any
time thereafter with impunity."); Hopkins v. Andaya, 958 F.2d
881, 887 (9th Cir. 1992) (dividing shooting into two segments
and holding that even if the use of deadly force was justified
initially, "the exigency of the situation lessened dramatically"
and the second use of deadly force was unreasonable).
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even though he posed no serious threat of physical
harm." Id.6
Petitioners appear to acknowledge that under
clearly established law when a threat ends, the need
for deadly force ends as well. See Pet. Br. 28
("Rather, the circuit courts have held [prior to 2004]
that where deadly force is constitutionally
permissible, it remains permissible until the threat
is eliminated; that is, officers can continue using
such force during the pendency of a threat.")
(emphasis added).
Petitioners nevertheless contend that "the use of
deadly force" was needed "to end this high-speed
chase" on the highway because it endangered the
public. Pet. Br. 3.7 Petitioners also argue that
6 Post-2004 decisions have repeatedly reached the same
conclusion. E.g., Lytle v. Bexar Cnty., Tex., 560 F.3d 404, 413
(5th Cir. 2009) ("But an exercise of force that is reasonable at
one moment can become unreasonable in the next if the
justification for the use of force has ceased."); Waterman v.
Barton, 393 F.3d 471, 481 (4th Cir. 2005) (W~e therefore hold
that force justified at the beginning of an encounter is not
justified even seconds later if the justification for the initial
force has been eliminated."); Lamont v. New Jersey, 637 F.3d
177, 184 (3d Cir. 2011) ("Even where an officer is initially
justified in using force, he may not continue to use such force
after it has become evident that the threat justifying the force
has vanished.").
7 See also Pet. Br. 4 ("When properly applied, are entitled to
qualified immunity because it was not beyond debate in July of
2004 that their use of deadly force to end the threat posed
during this dangerous high-speed police chase violated a clearly
established constitutional rule.") (emphasis added); Pet. Br. 3,
21-22, 27.
deadly force was needed to end the highway high-
speed chase because officers were in danger when
they tried to keep up with Rickard. See Pet. Br. 4
("jeopardizing the safety" of "the officers in the
pursuit"), 15. It is undisputed, however, that at the
time the officers fired on the vehicle, Rickard had
voluntarily left the highway and the highway chase
had ended. See U.S. Br. 24 (noting that "the deadly
force here was used during a period in which Rickard
was not driving at high speeds").
Petitioners argue that the use of deadly force was
justified because Rickard posed a threat to the safety
of the officers standing near his car in the lot. See
Pet. Br. 10. Officer Gardner claimed that he fired his
weapon because the vehicle posed "a danger to the
safety of police officers" J.A. 223-24. And officer
Galtelli stated that he fired his weapon because of
the threat to his own safety. J.A. 216-17, 217. The
videotape, however, indisputably shows that at the
moment officers Gardner and Galtelli fired their
weapons, Rickard’s vehicle was moving away from
them. See U.S. Br. 5 (citing to the videotape and
stating that Rickard’s vehicle was moving away from
the officers when Gardner and Galtelli fired 12 total
shots into Rickard’s vehicle).8 Assuming arguendo
that Rickard’s car presented a threat to the safety of
officer Plumoff who fired when the car was next to
him, and regardless of whether the other officers had
reason to be fearful before Rickard backed away from
them, by the time Gardner and Galtelli began firing,
those threats had ended.
8 No. 279 Video 11:14:29; No. 279 Video 11:14:30; No. 284 Video
12:17:10; No. 284 Video 12:17:11; Pet. App. 24.
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2. Petitioners argue that Rickard’s driving
endangered Rickard himself, and that they fired at
Rickard to protect him from injuring himself in a
crash. Pet. Br. 14 (~It was objectively reasonable for
defendant to conclude that Rickard was a danger to
himself."); Pet. Br. 25 ("Rickard was a danger to
himself’). But no reasonable officer could have
believed that it was reasonable to kill Rickard in
order to save him from the "danger to himself’ posed
by his own driving.9 Such a practice is so clearly
unconstitutional that it need not have been decided
in a similar case to give officers clear warning that
their actions were in violation of the law. See United
States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997) ("The
easiest cases don’t even arise. There has never been
... a section 1983 case accusing welfare officials of
selling foster children into slavery; it does not follow
that if such a case arose, the officials would be
immune from damages [or criminal] liability.")
(citations omitted).
3. Petitioners argue that the use of deadly force
was justified as a means to protect Rickard’s
passenger, Kelly Allen. Pet. Br. 14 (~It was
objectively reasonable for defendants to conclude
that Rickard was a danger to ... his passenger."); Pet.
Br. 25 (Rickard ~continued to pose a threat of serious
9 See Mercado v. City of Orlando, 407 F.3d 1152, 1157 (11th
Cir. 2005) (finding officer’s actions in shooting a non-dangerous
suicidal suspect in the head with a Sage Launcher, which
caused permanent brain damage, were clearly an unreasonable
response to the suspect’s threat of pointing a knife at his own
heart).
15
physical injury or death to ... his passenger.").
Assuming arguendo that Rickard was indeed driving
in a manner that "pose[d] a threat of serious physical
injury or death to... his passenger," the type of force
used by the police was clearly unreasonable. The
police did not use a type of force calculated to disable
without injuring Allen. To the contrary, the police
resorted to a level of force that was virtually certain
to, and indeed did, kill Allen herself. The officers
fired 15 bullets into the car, three from Allen’s side of
the car, and others at the moving car as it drove at
increasing distance away from the shooters. Because
they continued to fire as the car picked up speed, it
was highly likely that Allen would be killed or
injured if the bullets disabled Rickard and the car
crashed. The autopsy on Allen confirmed that either
the bullet that struck her in the head, or the crash of
the car, would have resulted in her death. Pet. App.
24; J.A. 60-61, 76-77 (autopsy reports). No officer
could believe that it would be reasonable to take
steps virtually guaranteed Allen’s death in order to
protect her from a "threat of serious physical injury
or death."
4. Petitioners argue that the use of deadly force
was justified because officers were subjectively afraid
when they fired. Pet. Br. 9-10. But it was clearly
established law prior to 2004 that only objective
conditions, not the subjective motivations or fears of
law enforcement officers, "bear[] on whether a
particular seizure is unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment." See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,
397 (1990). Similarly, the availability of qualified
immunity depends on objective factors; what the
15
officers subjectively believed is "irrelevant."
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987).
IV. A NUMBER OF THE JUSTIFICATIONS PROFFERED
BY PETITIONERS REST ON DISPUTED FACTS
1. The courts below concluded that summary
judgment was inappropriate in this case because
there were disputed issues of material fact. Pet. App.
10, 36, 38, 40. Petitioners make no effort to address
what factual issues may or may not be disputed.
Petitioners instead assert that "the court of appeals
fail[ed] to note any disputed material facts in its
opinion." Pet. Br. 16; see id. at 13 "[w]hile the court
of appeals suggested that factual disputes existed, it
failed to say what they were"). That is incorrect.
First, the Sixth Circuit pointed out that the district
court had identified a number of specific facts that
were in dispute, and accepted the trial court’s
assessment of those disputes.1° The district court had
identified three such material factual disputes, and
10 Pet. App. 10 n.3 ("The district court made a number.., of
findings as to disputed issues of fact, which we do not repeat
here, and which we cannot say were ’blatantly and
demonstrably false.~’); see id. at 8.
In light of Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (2005), where a
district court has concluded that a claim of qualified immunity
turns on disputed issues of fact, the Sixth Circuit will overturn
that district conclusion only when "the trial court’s
determination that a fact is subject to reasonable dispute is
blatantly and demonstrably false." Pet. App. 8 (quoting
Moldowan v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351, 370 (6th Cir. 2009)).
Because the district court determinations with regard to the
three identified disputes in this case were clearly correct, this
Court need not determine what standard of review governs
such determinations.
17
the court of appeals quoted two of those
determinations. Pet. App. 4-5. Second, the court of
appeals specifically explained that the video
recordings on which defendants relied failed to
resolve questions about "the degree of danger that
the officers were placed in as a result of Richard’s
alleged conduct." Pet. App. 10; see id. at 9. Under
these circumstances it was clearly incumbent upon
to address whether the issues identified by the
district court were disputed and material.
2. Although the procedures governing litigation of
qualified immunity are in certain respects different
than those applicable to most other issues, a motion
for summary judgment based on qualified immunity
must satisfy the usual standard established by Rule
56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Summary
judgment can be granted only "if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact .... "Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
[When a] case [is] decided on summary
judgment, there have not yet been factual
findings by a judge or jury .... When things
are in such a posture, courts are required to
view the facts and draw reasonable inferences
"in the light most favorable to the party
opposing the [summary judgment] motion."
United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655
(1962) (per curiam) .... In qualified immunity
cases, this usually means adopting, the
plaintiffs version of the facts.
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007).
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A movant can meet the Rule 56 standard by
showing that there are no disputes of fact at all, that
any disputes of fact are not material, or that the
evidence regarding a disputed issue of material fact
is so conclusive that no reasonable jury could resolve
that dispute in favor of the non-moving party.
Although summary judgment regarding a dispute
regarding material fact can be based on a video
recording of the events in question, the standard for
doing so is a demanding one. The unusual videotape
in Scott provided a basis for summary judgment
because it "quite clearly contradict[ed] the version of
the story told by [the plainti~." 550 U.So at 378.
When opposing parties tell two different stories,
one of which is blatantly contradicted by the
record, so that no reasonable jury could believe
it, a court should not adopt that version of the
facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for
summary judgment .... Respondent’s version of
events is so utterly discredited by the record
that no reasonable jury could have believed
him.
550 U.S. at 380. But where reasonable viewers could
disagree about what is depicted on a videotape, or
about the inferences to be drawn from those events,
the recording does not conclusively resolve the
underlying dispute. Like any other type of evidence,
a videotape must do more than provide support, even
strong support, for the contention of the moving
party; a video recording must, even when looked at
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,
"utterly discredit" that party’s contention. If
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"reasonable minds could differ as to the import of the
evidence," that evidence would not support an award
of summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242,250-51 (1986).
This Court’s decision in Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000), limits the
extent to which a party seeking summary judgment
regarding a disputed issue of material fact may rely
on depositions or affidavits. Reeves held in the
context of a post-trial motion for judgment as a
matter of law that the court "must disregard all
evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury
is not required to believe." 530 U.S. at 151. "The
court may only give credence to       ’evidence
supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted
and unimpeached, at least to the extent that that
evidence comes from disinterested witnesses.’" Id.
(quoting 9A c. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice
and Procedure, § 2529, 299 (2d ed. 1995)). That same
limitation applies to the materials that may be relied
on to obtain summary judgment. The standard for
summary judgment under Rule 56 is "very close" to
the Rule 50 directed verdict standard, the key
difference being "procedural." Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. at 251 ("’... summary judgment motions are
usually made before trial and decided on
documentary evidence, while directed verdict
motions are made at trial and decided on the
evidence that has been admitted.’") (internal citation
omitted).
The limitation in Reeves is of particular
importance where, as here, the only witnesses other
than the moving party who would have had personal
2O
knowledge of the material issue in question have
died at the hands of the moving party. In that
situation, although the non-moving party might have
little or no direct evidence of its own that
contradicted the evidence of the moving party, a jury
assuredly would not be "required to believe" the
account of the moving, and undeniably interested,
party. Of course, at trial a jury would be free to
credit the testimony of the moving party, but no
court would instruct a jury that it was obligated to do
so. The brief for respondent challenges the affidavits
and deposition statements of the defendants by
arguing that those statements are inconsistent or
ambiguous. But even if the testimonial evidence
proffered by a moving party is completely consistent
and entirely without ambiguity, a jury would not be
"required to believe" that evidence if the statements
came from interested witnesses.
In the instant case, the petitioners offered in
support of their summary judgment motion two quite
different types of evidence. First, they relied on
affidavits and deposition testimony from the
petitioners themselves. Second, they put in the
record three video recordings of all or part of the
events leading to Rickard’s death. Because the
petitioners themselves were necessarily interested
parties, the district judge properly limited its inquiry
to whether the video recordings, like the recording in
Scott v. Harris, "quite clearly contradict the version
of [the events urged by plaintiffs]." 550 U.S. at 378.
3. In the district court petitioners asserted that
during the chase on 1-40 Rickard repeatedly
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attempted to ram the cars of the police officers.
Correctly restricting his inquiry to whether the video
tapes themselves provided conclusive evidence of
such assaults, the district judge concluded the tapes
did not. "Although the Rickard vehicle and the
officers were engaging in a high-speed chase, the
video of the pursuit does not show any assaults, but
only the Rickard vehicle changing lanes. It is difficult
to determine the exact proximity of the vehicles
during the case. The... videos of the chase[] would
not support a reasonable person in concluding that
there were aggravated assaults." Pet. App. 36. The
videos are inconclusive, in part, because the cars of
officer Plumhoff, (who was leading the chase) and
officer Evans had no video recorders, and the
recorder in officer Gardner’s car did not work. Pet.
App. 20-21.11
In this Court petitioners assert repeatedly that
Rickard attempted to ram the police cars while they
were on the highway. Petitioners do not, however,
contend that the video recordings themselves depict
such events. Rather, petitioners argue that "[i]n
deposition and affidavit testimony, the officers
described what appeared to them to be Rickard
attempting to veer or ram his car into Plumhoffs and
Evans’s police cars .... (J.A. 176-77[Plumhoff
11 See Pet. App 21-22 ("Whether there were in fact felony
charges at this point is disputed .... That activity is not clearly
depicted on the video and is disputed."), 38 ("The videotape here
shows only that the vehicles were changing lanes and swerving
through traffic. Based on that evidence, the Court concludes
that the officer’s perception that they were the victims of
assault was not objectively reasonable.").
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affidavit], 228 [Evans affidavit], 234 [same])." (Pet.
Br. 7). But because Plumhoff and Evans are
petitioners, and thus interested parties, the jury
would not be required to believe their testimony, and
it cannot be relied upon to demonstrate that there is
conclusive evidence regarding that issue. Petitioners
also point to the fact that during the chase Plumhoff
and Evans reported on their radios that Rickard had
acted in that manner; but the recording only
conclusively establishes that the reports were made
over the radio, not that the reports were accurate (or
necessarily believed by the officers). Of course, at
trial a jury might chose to find the radio reports
significant evidence supporting the officer’s
testimony, but it would not be required to do so. The
radio recordings alone are assuredly not conclusive;
indeed, at least unless merely intended to
corroborate trial testimony by the two officers, the
recordings themselves would be inadmissible
hearsay if offered to prove the truth of their contents.
In the district court the petitioners contended that
Rickard, after leaving the highway, intentionally
drove into a head-on collision with officer Plumhoffs
car, and that court understood the petitioners to
argue as well that Rickard’s car spun out after he
deliberately hit officer Evans’ car. Neither Plumhoffs
car nor Evans’ car had video recorders, and the
district judge thus concluded that the circumstances
of those collisions were disputed issues. "Defendants
¯ . . argue that Rickard posed an immediate threat
because he intentionally rammed two police vehicles
in Memphis.       Whether the Rickard vehicle
intentionally collided with the vehicles or collided
with the Plumhoff vehicle as a result of momentum
from an unintentional collision with the Evans
vehicle is a disputed issue of material fact. As such,
it cannot serve as the foundation for concluding that
the officers’ conduct was objectively reasonable."12
Pet. App. 38; see Pet. App 4 (quoting district court)).
In this Court, petitioners appear to have abandoned
the contention that the collision with Plumhoffs or
Evans’ cars were deliberate acts on Rickard’s part.
They refer to the collision with Plumhoff without
asserting that Rickard intended that collision, or was
in control of his car, when it occurred1~, and they
note that Evans was following Rickard when their
cars collided.14
The district court also concluded that there was a
material dispute of fact as to whether Rickard was
"revving" his car engine when (or immediately
before) the officers began firing. In the lower court
the petitioners relied heavily on their contention that
Rickard was doing so, apparently on the theory that
by gunning his engine Rickard was indicating an
intent to accelerate in the direction of the officers.
The trial judge concluded that the video recording,
although depicting this period of time, was not
12 "Defendants assert that the Rickard vehicle then turned
directly toward Plumhoffs vehicle and had a head-on collision
with it. Plaintiffs dispute these statements and aver that the
Rickard vehicle was still moving forward after contact with
Evans’ vehicle and that this momentum caused the collision
with Plumhoffs vehicle." Pet. App. 22-23.
13 Pet. Br. 8 ("Rickard collided head-on with Plumhoffs
cruiser"), 27 ("collided with police vehicles"), 37 ("there was a
collision between Rickard and Plumhoffs cars, and Rickard
spun out").
14 Pet. Br. 8 ("Rickard was hit by a pursuing vehicle.").
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sufficiently clear to establish the correctness of this
contention. "Defendants assert that [Rickard’s]
vehicle engine was ’revving,’ but Plaintiffs dispute
this and state that the vehicle was rocking back and
forth, and it is unclear whether the engine noise in
conjunction with this rocking motion should be
characterized as revving the engine." Pet. App 23; see
Pet. App. 5 (quoting district court)).15 Petitioners no
longer refer to this "revving" theory, which they
apparently have abandoned.
In this Court, rely on a different account of what
occurred after Rickard’s car spun out onto the
parking lot. Earlier, in their briefs in the court of
appeals, petitioners described Rickard’s car as
merely "rocking back and forth against the front of
Gardner’s car as its tires squealed/spun."
Defendants-Appellants’ Brief, 5.16    The phrase
"rocking back and forth" suggests that the motion
was the incidental effect of the failure of the tires on
Rickard’s car to get enough traction to move the car
in one direction. But in this Court petitioners
advance a far more threatening account of what
occurred, describing Rickard as having "accelerated"
and deliberately and repeatedly "ramming" into
Gardner’s car. (Pet. Br. 3, 9, 27, 32, 37, 39). That
suggests that Rickard drove deliberately and with
considerable force into Gardner’s car, backed away,
15 "Although the . . . Defendants contend that the car was
’revving’ when the first shots were fired, that is a disputed
issue." Pet. App. 40.
16 See Defendants-Appellants’ Reply Brief, 2 ("The video . . .
reveals that Rickard’s car’s tires were spinning freely and
rocking against one of the police cars.").
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and then did the same thing several more times.17
The video recording of these events, however, does
not support petitioners’ current account; rather, they
show Rickard’s car, as petitioners asserted below,
merely rocking back and forth, as he attempts,
initially without success, to back up, touching
Gardner’s car only incidentally with no acceleration
in the direction of that car or without any other
indication of an intent on Rickard’s part to hit the
officer’s vehicle.
Petitioners offer two justifications for the use of
force based on what occurred when Rickard,
subsequent to his contact (of whatever nature) with
the Gardner car had ended, was backing out of the
parking lot. Petitioners assert that Rickard’s car hit
Evans on the handis, and that Ellis was forced "to
step to his right"19 to avoid being struck by Rickard’s
car. The first contention rests solely on Evans’
deposition; because a jury would not be required to
believe the assertion that Rickard actually injured
Evans, that assertion cannot support summary
judgment. Ellis can be seen on the video stepping to
one side as Rickard backs out of the lot, but both
Ellis and the car are moving slowly. Petitioners do
not contend that Rickard was trying to hit Evans, or
17 See Pet. Br. at 3 (~Three of the officers used deadly force only
ai~r Rickard repeatedly rammed a police car in front of him
and then drove in reverse in the direction of officers on foot
trying to arrest him.~). This suggests that Rickard was
deliberately (and repeatedly) driving forward when he hits
Gardner’s car.
18 Pet. Br. 10 (citing J.A. 229 and 234).
19 Pet. Br. 10; see id. at I, 27, 37, 39.
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even that Rickard knew that Ellis was standing
behind his car. No less importantly, both of these
events occurred after the shooting began; the officers
began firing before Rickard began to back away from
Gardner’s car. 20 Actions taken by Rickard after the
shooting began obviously cannot provide a
justification for the first volley of shots that occurred
at an earlier point in time. In the district court,
petitioners argued that once the officers began to fire
at Rickard at close range, it was an "astonishing act
of defiance" on the part of Rickard to attempt to
drive away from the officers who were shooting at
him.21 But surely any sensible adult would flee from
gunmenwpolice officers or not--who were trying to
kill him.
4. Although the petition in this case insisted the
circumstances here are indistinguishable from those
in Scott v. Harris, the differences are palpable.
Harris was driving on a two-lane winding country
road, with oncoming traffic and possible pedestrians
at risk. Rickard was on a divided, six lane interstate
highway; there was no oncoming traffic and no
pedestrians. Harris deliberately drove into the
oncoming lane; Rickard did not, and could not have
done so. Harris, but not Rickard, ran through several
red lights. Harris was driving 85 m.p.h, on a road
with a 55 m.p.h, speed limit; at that speed he was at
20 Pet. Br. 9 (~[i]mmediately after the Honda began ramming
Gardner"s patrol unit, Plumhoff fired three rounds at the
driver"), 32 (~While at the time of the first three shots in this
case, Rickard was not covering much ground in the Honda, he
was using it to ram Officer Gardner’s car.").
21 Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, 13.
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great risk of losing control of his car when rounding
curves, and had to move into oncoming traffic
whenever he wanted to pass a car going the speed
limit. In the instant case the only affidavit regarding
Rickard’s speed states it was "at least 75 m.p.h." J.A.
353. The speed limit on 1-40 is 70 m.p.h.22, and like
all interstate highways it is curved and banked in a
manner to permit cars to drive with safety at speeds
that would be dangerous on a windy country road.
For a number of years in past decades, several
western states had substantially higher speed limits
on roads of similar design.
Passenger
Number of
traffic.
No Yes
85 m.p.h, in 55 "At least 75" in
m.p.h, zone 70 m.p.h, zone
2 lanes 6 lanes
No
Yes
Yes
No (divided)
Yes (2) No
22 See Governors Highway Safety Association, Survey of the
States: Speeding, United States Department of Transportation
Federal       Highway       Administration       (2005),
http://safety.fhwa.dot.gov/speedmgt/ref_mats/fhwasa09028/reso
urces/surveystates_speeding.pdf.
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Pedestrians Yes No
nearby
Forced cars Yes Disputed
to pull over
Wind~g Yes No
road
~e: of P.I.T. maneuver 15 bullets
force used on clear road
V. THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT ADVANCE A SOUND
BASIS FOR CONCLUDING THAT THE DEFENDANTS
ARE ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
The United States does not rely on the disputed
facts that are the bases for the defendants’ argument
for qualified immunity. The government specifically
takes no position as to whether the video recording
demonstrates that while in the lot Rickard "posed an
immediate threat to the safety of the officers." U.S.
Br. 20-21 n.1. It merely notes that there is a dispute
as to whether Rickard intentionally rammed
Plumhoffs car. U.S. Br. 4. The government’s brief
observe that several officers reported on the radio
that Rickard had attempted to collide with them on
the highway, but does not assert Rickard actually
attempted to do so. U.S. Br. 3-4. And the United
States does not even mention the defendants’
contention that Rickard repeatedly accelerated and
rammed Gardner’s car in the parking lot; to the
contrary, the government’s brief describes the video
as revealing only that Rickard’s vehicle "moved
slightly forward into officer Garner’s vehicle." U.S.
Br. 4.
The Solicitor General contends, however, that the
limited facts that are undisputed are sufficient to
demonstrate that the defendants are entitled to
qualified immunity.
1. The government relies, first, on a repeated
assertion that "the video makes clear" (U.S. Br. 21)
that during the time Rickard’s car was in the
parking lot he operated it "recklessly" (U.S. Br. I, 11,
12, 21, 30) or "in a dangerous manner." (Id. 21, 26;
see id. 27 ("attempted dangerously to evade
apprehension aider being cornered")). The Solicitor
General’s assertion that Rickard was operating the
car in the parking lot in a "dangerous manner" is
inconsistent with footnote 1 of the government’s
brief, which expressly does not challenge the district
court’s conclusion that there is a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether Rickard posed a danger
to the officers. U.S. Br. 19-20 n.1.
In seven of these passages, the government’s brief
simply does not explain what actions by Rickard
constituted that assertedly reckless or dangerous
conduct. Such a conclusory assertion, without more,
is insufficient to support a claim of qualified
immunity. In one passage the government does
offer an explanation of this contention.
The video evidence demonstrates       that
Rickard was operating the vehicle in a reckless
manner during his close-quarters encounter
with the police, in which he made a series of
sudden maneuvers with the car despite the fact
that the officers were standing only steps away
and ordering him to stop.
U.S. Br. 19.
The first "maneuver" that is visible in the video
recordings is that Rickard backed away from most of
the officers. Although one officer (Plumhoff) was
beside the car, Rickard drove straight back. Another
officer (Ellis) was behind the car, but Rickard drove
sufficiently slowly that Ellis said he "moved out of
the way" avoid the car. J.A. 211. The car does not
appear to be moving at any great speed, as Ellis’s
response confirms. What is visible on the recording
does not conclusively demonstrate dangerous
behavior.
The other "maneuver" that occurred when, having
backed away from the officers, Rickard put his car in
drive and drove out of the lot. Although the officers
may have at that point been "only steps away," they
were behind Rickard and he was driving away from
them. Obviously that maneuver posed no danger to
the officers; whether Rickard changed gears or drove
away "suddenly" is not apparent on the recording.
Even if Rickard’s actions in backing away from the
officers, or in driving out of the lot, could be
characterized as reckless or even dangerous, those
maneuvers occurred after the police began firing at
Rickard. The government repeatedly describes the
sequence of events as though the officers did not fire
at Rickard until aider (and because) he had backed
away, turned his car, and was driving away--the
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asserted "sudden maneuvers." "[P]etitioners used
deadly force to terminate th[e] chase after Rickard
operated the vehicle in a reckless manner in an
attempt to escape." (Emphasis added).23 Most of the
bullets, however, were actually fired before the point
in time when the "maneuver[s]" relied on by the
government occurred.
2. The government suggests that a reasonable
officer could believe that the use of lethal force was
warranted because, before Rickard left the highway,
he was driving at "high-speed." (U.S. Br. 11, 12, 19,
20, 21, 26, 30). But the United States advances no
contention regarding either the actual speed of
23 u.s. Br. I (~question presented is whether are entitled to
qualified immunity where police officers ~use deadly force to
prevent a suspect who . . . has operated a vehicle recklessly
during a close-quarters encounter from resuming his vehicular
flight")(emphasis added), 11 (’the question here is whether in
2004 it was clearly established that the police may not use
deadly force to prevent a misdemeanant . . . from resuming a
dangerous, high-speed chase.., after_the driver had recklessly
operated the vehicle . . . in a close-quarters encounter with
police’)(emphasis added), 12 ("[i]n 2004, it was not clearly
established that a police officer may not use deadly force to
prevent a suspect who.., operated his vehicle recklessly during
a close-quarters encounter from resuming his vehicular
flight’)(emphasis added), 19 ("the qualified-immunity question
is whether a police officer may shot a motorist who . . . once
cornered, operates a vehicle in a dangerous manner in an
attempt to evade capture and resume his flight’)(footnote
omitted), 26 (~[a] reasonable officer canvassing Sixth Circuit
precedent in 2004 would not have had clear notice that the
Fourth Amendment prohibits the use of deadly force to prevent
a person who has just .... operated a vehicle in a dangerous
manner once stopped, from returning to the public
roads’)(emphasis added).
Rickard’s car or the speed limit on 1-40. On an
interstate highway, cars driving at or even below the
posted speed limit would normally be described as
moving at a high speed. There could of course be
cases in which a car’s speed was so great, in the
context of the circumstances in which the car was
being driven, that the speed alone posed a
sufficiently real threat of harm to bystanders or
pursuing police as to arguably meet the standard in
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). But a party
asserting a claim of qualified immunity must
establish the speed with which a car was traveling,
and articulate why--on the road and in the
circumstances at issue--it presentedsuch a
danger.24 The United States does neither.
The United States also asserts that the manner in
which Rickard was driving his car on 1-40 was
"dangerous." U.S. Br. 11, 12, 20, 26. But the meaning
of this contention is unclear.    Perhaps the
government contends that the speed of Rickard’s car
alone was sufficient to endanger others, but such a
contention cannot succeed when the government
takes no position as to how fast Rickard’s car was
traveling, or why that speed would be dangerous on a
divided interstate highway expressly designed for
high speeds. Perhaps the government credits the
24 The United States sought to do so in its brief in Scott v.
Harris. "It is undisputed that the officers observed respondent
driving at least 90 miles per hour in a 55 mile-per-hour zone...
[H]e . . . presented a serious risk to other vehicles or
pedestrians, because anyone driving 90 miles per hour can lose
control at any moment and does not have sufficient time to
react to unpredictable events." Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 17.
contention that Rickard repeatedly attempted to ram
police cars while on the highway; but the government
does not disagree with the district court’s conclusion
that that contention presented a genuine issue of
material fact.
The government at one point argues that "Scott
makes clear that the district court erred in
determining that the dangers Rickard posed to the
public by ’swerving in traffic while traveling at a
high speed’ and operating the vehicle with ’disregard
for the safety of others’ were irrelevant... Pet. App.
37." U.S. Br. 24. But the reference to "swerving" and
"disregard for the safety of others" are not findings
by the district court, but summaries by that court of
the factual contentions advanced by the defendants.
The United States suggests that a reasonable
officer could conclude that the Sixth Circuit decision
in Smith v. Freland, 954 F.2d 343 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 504 U.S. 915 (1992), had held that police may
use lethal force to prevent a motorist from returning
to the road if the driver has led police on "a high-
speed chase." U.S. Br. 26. The driver in Smith had
been traveling "at speeds in excess of ninety miles
per hour," 954 F.3d at 343, in a residential
neighborhood. Scott v. Clay County, Tennessee, 205
F.3d 867, 878 (6th Cir. 2000). No reasonable officer
could conclude that Smith had held that such force
was permissible against anyone who drives on an
interstate highway at any speed that could be
labeled "high-speed." The court’s conclusion in
Smith that the driver "had proven he would do
almost anything to avoid capture," 954 F.2d at 347,
clearly rested on the fact that the driver in that case
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twice attempted to crash into police cars, successfully
crashed into another, and then "smash[ed] into [a]
fence and gate" as he drove off. 954 F.2d at 344. The
Sixth Circuit concluded that the driver "posed a
significant threat of injury to numerous others,"
Dudley v. Eden, 260 F.3d 722, 726 (2001), because he
had in fact attempted to injure the police officers.
The government describes Scott v. Clay Cnty, Tenn.,
205 F.3d 867 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 874
(2000), as "finding no Fourth Amendment violation
for police shooting [a] motorist aider [a] high-speed
flight." (U.S. Br. 27). The driver in Scott had done
far more than just fell; he attempted to run over a
Sheriff and Deputy Sheriff, "commit[ing] serious,
life-threatening crimes in the presence of the
defendant officers." 205 F.3d at 877.
In the instant case, Rickard had chosen to exit 1-
40; the issue is whether the manner in which he had
driven on the highway demonstrated he was likely to
drive on city streets in a manner that posed a
significant threat to the safety of others.25 If there
were an indisputable video recording which
demonstrated that while on the highway Rickard
had driven at 100 m.p.h., repeatedly attempted to
ram police cars, and swerved in front of other cars,
forcing them to the side of the road, those would be
facts on the basis of which a reasonable officer could
25 "If successful in that attempt [to get back on the road],
Richard might have posed precisely the same threat to
innocent bystanders as the motorist in Scott." U.S. Br.
24(emphasis added).
conclude that the use of lethal force was justified to
prevent Rickard from returning to the road. But the
unresolved disputes about what occurred on 1-40
preclude summary judgment on such a theory.
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